Kelsen's concept of the authority of law

Law and Philosophy 19 (2):173-199 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to Kelsen, law is a sense content and law has authority. The combination of these two claims appears puzzling. How is it possible for a sense content to have authority? Kelsen's notion of `basic norm' seems to provide an answer to this question. Such an answer, however, simply leads to a new formulation of the question itself. How is a basic norm possible? Kelsen's multiple and tentative answers to this question turn out to be untenable. A different starting point might be provided by Kelsen's notion of `social power'. On closer scrutiny, however, an empowerment account of Kelsen's concept of the authority of law proves unsatisfactory. Thus, our review of some candidate models for a Kelsenian explication of the authority of law shows that none of them is a viable hypothesis. Kelsen's concept of the authority of law is, at bottom, unintelligible.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,388

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Authority and authorisation.B. Roermund - 2000 - Law and Philosophy 19 (2):201-222.
Authority and authorisation.Bert van Roermund - 2000 - Law and Philosophy 19 (2):201-222.
Authority and representation.Hans Lindahl - 2000 - Law and Philosophy 19 (2):223-246.
The authority of law: essays on law and morality.Joseph Raz - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
89 (#243,458)

6 months
8 (#390,329)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Kelsen on Validity.Riccardo Guastini - 2016 - Ratio Juris 29 (3):402-409.

Add more citations

References found in this work

On referring.Peter F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.

Add more references