Looking for structure in all the wrong places: Ramsey sentences, multiple realisability, and structure

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (4):633-655 (2006)
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Abstract

‘Epistemic structural realism’ (ESR) insists that all that we know of the world is its structure, and that the ‘nature’ of the underlying elements remains hidden. With structure represented via Ramsey sentences, the question arises as to how ‘hidden natures’ might also be represented. If the Ramsey sentence describes a class of realisers for the relevant theory, one way of answering this question is through the notion of multiple realisability. We explore this answer in the context of the work of Carnap, Hintikka and Lewis. Both Carnap and Hintikka offer clear structuralist perspectives which, crucially, accommodate the openness inherent in theory change. Unfortunately there is little purchase for a viable form of realism in either case. Lewis’s approach, on the other hand, offers more scope for realism but, as we shall see, concerns arise as to whether a relevant form of structuralism can be maintained. In particular his thesis of Ramseyan humility undermines certain conceptions of scientific laws that the structural realist might naturally cleave to. Our overall conclusion is that the representational device of Ramsey sentence plus multiple realisability can accommodate either the structuralist or realist aspects of ESR but has difficulties capturing both

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Author Profiles

Steven French
University of Leeds
Angelo Cei
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Structural Realism.James Ladyman - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Vi*-Structure as a Weapon of the Realist1.Steven French - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):167-185.

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References found in this work

How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.
Ramseyan humility.David K. Lewis - 2008 - In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Bradford. pp. 203-222.

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