Animals, Heidegger, and the Right to Life

Environmental Ethics 4 (3):249-254 (1982)
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Abstract

Quantitative utilitarianism demands equal treatment of human and nonhuman animals where there are no relevant differences between them. A difference is relevant only if it excludes the animal from suffering evil if it is treated differently. Quantitative utilitarianism cannot, however, resolve conflicts of interest nor prove that painless killing of animals is morally wrong. For this we need a higher qualitativegood. I suggest Care, as Heidegger understands it, is such a good, and that it is the essence not only of human, but of nonhuman animaI Dasein as well. Because animals care, we are morally obliged to desist from killing them, even painlessly.

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