Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing

Synthese 197 (12):5117-5136 (2016)
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Abstract

In Chapter 3 of Judgment and Agency, Sosa (Judgment and Agency, 2015) explicates the concept of a fully apt performance. In the course of doing so, he draws from illustrative examples of practical performances and applies lessons drawn to the case of cognitive performances, and in particular, to the cognitive performance of judging. Sosa’s examples in the practical sphere are rich and instructive. But there is, I will argue, an interesting disanalogy between the practical and cognitive examples he relies on. Ultimately, I think the source of the disanalogy is a problematic picture of the cognitive performance of guessing and its connection to knowledge and defeat. Once this critical line of argument is advanced, an alternative picture of guessing, qua cognitive performance, is articulated, one which avoids the problems discussed, and yet remains compatible with Sosa’s broader framework.

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reprint Carter, J. Adam (2018) "Sosa on Knowledge, Judgment and Guessing". Synthese 0():1-20

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J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler, John Hawthorne & Julianne Chung (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 278-305.
On behalf of a bi-level account of trust.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2299-2322.

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