Abstract

This dissertation argues the following point: that Jean-Paul Sartre in his Critique of Dialectical Reason makes a significant contribution to what can be called the Marxist theory of social conditioning. It attempts to answer the question how is man "made," or socially produced, for Sartre in a way that avoids reducing history to a crudely deterministic and causal sequence that would render freedom meaningless. The claim is made that for Sartre the key to grasping a theory of social conditioning that at the same time takes into account human freedom lies in a view of man as material praxis and transcendence. The dissertation enters into a description of traditional dialectical materialism and examines Sartre's conclusion that it is responsible for the present crisis in Marxist philosophy, and that it generates a plainly deterministic theory of man and history. The meaning of a critique of dialectical reason is discussed and how such a critique points toward a non-positivistic interpretation of Marxism. In what is the heart of the dissertation, Sartre's philosophic view of man is examined as a point of departure for an analysis of the various aspects of conditioning that Sartre elaborates in his Critique. While drawing from the Critique in general, the dissertation directs its attention primarily toward the level of the individual, emphasizing Book I: "From Individual Praxis to the Practico-Inert." This entails a detailed analysis of such key Sartrean terms as praxis, scarcity, practico-inert materiality, alienation, counter-finality, necessity, and seriality. Finally, in the way of a conclusion, it is argued that Sartre's view of social conditioning renders plausible the thesis that man possesses the ability to transform the historical situation in the direction of a freer and more humane future