Abstract

What is it to be objective in our evaluations of claims of social justice? What should be that standard that determines what is the correct use of reason regarding what is just? As an answer to these questions, in this dissertation I propose an alternative conception of objectivity: objectivity as trans-positionality. My argument is the following: in order for our evaluations of justice to be objective, there are normative reasons of justice conditioned by one’s social, historical, cultural, and biological contingencies that we need to consider. My proposal is that objectivity comes from our capacity to consider some of these reasons to be relevant across positions: reasons are objective across positions when we can take them to be trans-positional, by engaging in a process of scrutiny involving all the reasons we need to consider at the positional level. In other words, objectivity as trans-positionality corresponds to the process of scrutiny that will allow us to move from what is normative and objective at the positional level to what is normative and objective at the trans-positional level. Those reasons that can survive trans-positional scrutiny will be trans-positionally objective reasons. But in order to be objective in the sense just described, we need to know how we achieve objective evaluations. Namely, I argue, we are to participate in the exercise of trans-positional scrutiny by engaging with other positions — rather than detaching from them. That means that we need to engage in forms of scrutiny that involve getting to know and understand as best as possible the positions and reasons we are scrutinising. My argument will be that we should do this by 1) using diverse forms of communication with others while including as many positions as possible in that exercise; and 2) trying to know and understand other positions via imaginative perspectivetaking.