On Presentism, Endurance, and Change

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):491-510 (2002)
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Abstract

We note in Section I that an acceptable formulation of Presentism must preserve its consistency with Transient Time and inconsistency with Static Time. After arguing in Section II that certain formulations of Presentism are unacceptable, we offer in Section III a formulation of Presentism that we defend against the charge of triviality.

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Citations of this work

An Improper Introduction to Epistemic utility theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - In Henk de Regt, Samir Okasha & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Proceedings of EPSA09. Berlin: Springer. pp. 287--301.
Demarcating presentism.Christian Wuthrich - 2011 - In Henk W. De Regt, Stephan Hartmann & Samir Okasha (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 441--450.
Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2011 - In Henk W. De Regt, Stephan Hartmann & Samir Okasha (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.
Sustaining a rational disagreement.Christoph Kelp & Igor Douven - 2011 - In Henk W. De Regt, Stephan Hartmann & Samir Okasha (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 101--110.

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