Abstract

RESUMEN En este artículo discuto acerca de la polémica entre Harry Frankfurt y Susan Wolf respecto a si es o no es importante que aquello que amamos sea objetivamente valioso, y si una vida completamente inmoral es tan valiosa como otra vida moral. Sostengo que aunque Frankfurt tiene razón al decir que el solo hecho de amar ya es valioso, eso no basta para una praxis plena. Dado que nuestros fines determinan nuestras elecciones, aquello que amemos determinará el tipo de vida que tengamos y no cualquiera da igual. ABSTRACT In this paper I discuss the controversy between Harry Frankfurt and Susan Wolf as to whether or not it is important that what we care about is objectively valuable, and whether a completely immoral life is as valuable as a moral life. I argue that although Frankfurt is right in saying that the mere act of caring is already valuable, that is not enough for a meaningful praxis. Given that our ends in life determine our choices, whatever we love will determine the kind of life we have, and different kinds of life are not equally valuable.