Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):181-199 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge-how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti-intellectualism. Unlike neo-Rylean anti-intellectualist views, according to which the possession of knowledge-how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge-how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):662-685.
Varieties of cognitive achievement.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1603-1623.
Intellectualism About Knowledge How and Slips.Cathrine V. Felix - 2020 - Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Philosophia:11-31.
Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104.
Knowledge-how: A unified account.Berit Brogaard - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett, Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 136-160.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-01-16

Downloads
1,490 (#11,460)

6 months
175 (#23,020)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine
J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Inferring by Attaching Force.Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):701-714.

View all 38 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle & Daniel C. Dennett - 1949 - New York: University of Chicago Press.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

View all 56 references / Add more references