In Defence of First-Order Representationalism

Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (5-6):74-87 (2017)
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Abstract

Carruthers (2000; 2005) provides a general defence of reductive representationalism about phenomenal consciousness while critiquing first-order theories of the sort proposed by Baars (1988), Tye (1995), Dennett (2001), and others (thereby motivating a form of higher-order account). The present paper defends first-order theories against that attack.

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