Epistemic relativism and the naturalistic fallacy

In Neil Sinclair (ed.), The Naturalistic Fallacy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (2018)
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James Carter
Oxford University

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Archimedean Metanorms.J. Adam Carter - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1075-1085.

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