A Note on Assertion, Relativism and Future Contingents

Logos and Episteme 3 (1):139-144 (2012)
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Abstract

I argue that John MacFarlane's attempt to reconcile his proposed truthrelativist account of future contingents with a plausible account of assertion is self-defeating. Specifically, a paradoxical result of MacFarlane's view is that assertions of future contingents are impermissible for anyone who already accepts MacFarlane's own truth-relativist account of future contingents.

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J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow

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