Anankastic Conditionals and the Default Theory of Reasons

Abstract

I identify and develop a solution to the puzzles of anankastic conditionals that is novel in the sense that it has gone largely unnoticed, but also well-worn in that the materials for it have long been available. The solution involves an integration of the classical Kratzerian premise semantics and a default theory of reasons (such as the one presented in Horty, 2012, leveraging several decades of research on default logic). To stress-test the proposal I also investigate how it might be applied to the variety of anankastic-adjacent data discussed by Condoravdi and Lauer (2016). The resulting approach is not just an exceptional fit for the problem of anankastic conditionals, but also an independently promising upgrade on the classical account of modals.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-11-08

Downloads
276 (#96,687)

6 months
276 (#8,068)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Fabrizio Cariani
University of Maryland, College Park

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Defaults in update semantics.Frank Veltman - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):221 - 261.
Imperatives and Modals.Paul Portner - 2007 - Natural Language Semantics 15 (4):351-383.

View all 36 references / Add more references