What We Talk about When We Talk about Truth: Dewey, Wittgenstein, and the Pragmatic Test

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (2):159-180 (2021)
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Abstract

Pragmatic theories of truth need to pass the pragmatic test: they need to make a difference. Unfortunately, defenders of the pragmatic theory have rarely applied this test. I argue that a Deweyan pragmatic account of truth passes the test by identifying the political and epistemic dangers of certain types of social networks that create a durable consensus around false beliefs. To better understand Dewey’s account of truth I propose an excursion through Wittgenstein’s later views on knowledge and certainty.

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John Capps
Rochester Institute of Technology

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References found in this work

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
Pragmatism: a new name for some old ways of thinking.William James - 2019 - Gorham, ME: Myers Education Press. Edited by Eric C. Sheffield.
The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.

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