Epistemic Emotions: The Case of Wonder

Revista de Filosofia Aurora 31 (54) (2019)
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Abstract

In this paper I discuss the reasons for which we may consider wonder an epistemic emotion. I defend the thesis for which a specific type of wonder is aporia-based and that since it is aporia-based, this wonder is epistemic. The epistemic wonder is thus an interrogating wonder which plays the epistemic function of motivation to questioning in processes of inquiry. I first introduce the contemporary debate on epistemic emotions, and then I analyze the characteristics that make of wonder an epistemic emotion, from a data-based, phenomenological, and conceptual perspective.

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References found in this work

The Complete Works: The Rev. Oxford Translation.Jonathan Barnes (ed.) - 1984 - Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology.Alison M. Jaggar - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):151 – 176.

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