The Parent Trap: Why Choice-Dependent Moral Theories Fail to Deliver the Asymmetry

Utilitas (forthcoming)
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Abstract

According to the Asymmetry, creating a miserable person is wrong but failing to create a happy person is permissible, other things being equal. Some attempt to underwrite the Asymmetry by appealing to a choice-dependent moral theory according to which the deontic status of an act depends on whether it is chosen by the agent. We show that all choice-dependent moral theories in the literature are vulnerable to what we call the Parent Trap. These theories imply that the presence of impermissible options can generate a moral requirement to create happy people, even at the cost of the procreator’s well-being. We consider two new choice-dependent theories that avoid this result, but show that they generate implausible moral permissions to create miserable people. Either way, choice-dependent theories fail to do justice to the intuitions that motivate the Asymmetry.

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Author Profiles

Patrick Kaczmarek
University of St. Andrews
Timothy Campbell
Rutgers - New Brunswick

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References found in this work

The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People.David Boonin - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Can we harm and benefit in creating?Elizabeth Harman - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):89–113.
Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry.Johann Frick - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):53-87.

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