The generality constraint and categorial restrictions

Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):209–231 (2004)
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Abstract

We should not admit categorial restrictions on the significance of syntactically well formed strings. Syntactically well formed but semantically absurd strings, such as ‘Life’s but a walking shadow’ and ‘Caesar is a prime number’, can express thoughts; and competent thinkers both are able to grasp these and ought to be able to. Gareth Evans’ generality constraint, though Evans himself restricted it, should be viewed as a fully general constraint on concept possession and propositional thought. For (a) even well formed but semantically cross-categorial strings often do possess substantive inferential roles; (b) hearers exploit these inferential roles in interpreting such strings metaphorically; (c) there is no good reason to deny truth-conditions to strings with inferential roles.

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Elisabeth Camp
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Thinking with maps.Elizabeth Camp - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):145–182.
Perspectives in imaginative engagement with fiction.Elisabeth Camp - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):73-102.
Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus‐Independence.Elisabeth Camp - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):275-311.
Nonsense: a user's guide.Manish Oza - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1959 - Garden City, N.Y.: Routledge.
Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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