The metaphysics of time reversal: Hutchison on classical mechanics

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):331-340 (1995)
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Abstract

What grounds the standard claim that classical mechanics is time-reversal invariant? Hutchison (1993, 1995) challenges the conventional reasoning underlying the belief that classical mechanics is time reversal invariant and argues that it is not in any well-defined sense. I find a defensible criterion that will exclude his cases, thereby rescuing a sense in which we can say that classical mechanics is time reversal invariant.

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2009-01-28

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Craig Callender
University of California, San Diego

Citations of this work

Time in Thermodynamics.Jill North - 2011 - In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press. pp. 312--350.
The Norton Dome and the Nineteenth Century Foundations of Determinism.Marij van Strien - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):167-185.
The Direction of Time.Steven F. Savitt - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (3):347-370.
What Counts as a Newtonian System? The View from Norton’s Dome.Samuel Craig Fletcher - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3):275-297.

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