Principled Divestiture and Moral Integrity

Analysis 51 (2):112 - (1991)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

How is principled divestiture possible, for it passes the guilt of ownership from seller to buyer, thus exchanging one wrong for another? In response to this puzzle I posed (Analysis 47.3), Roger Shiner argues that since the seller does not cause the buyer to act, the seller maintains moral integrity. But your wish to sell your stock is logically equivalent to your wishing someone to buy it. By hypothesis you believe it wrong for anyone to buy it. So your wish to sell is the wish that someone else do wrong. And that desire is immoral. The puzzle thus remains unsolved

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,101

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
115 (#195,577)

6 months
4 (#976,702)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Steven Cahn
CUNY Graduate Center

Citations of this work

Principled Divestiture Revisited.Jeremy Gwiazda - 2010 - Public Affairs Quarterly 24 (4):335-350.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references