Correctness conditions for property nominalists

Synthese 201 (6):1-12 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Nominalists need some account of correctness for sentences committed to the existence of abstract objects. This paper proposes a new statement of such conditions specifically for properties. The account builds on an earlier proposal of mine, but avoids the counter-examples against the latter pointed out by Thomas Schindler, particularly, the sentence ‘There are inexpressible properties’. I argue that the new proposal is independently motivated and more faithful to the spirit of the kind of error-theoretic nominalism that the original proposal was part of. Along the way, I also propose novel treatments of Arthur Pap’s and W.V.O. Quine’s notoriously hard-to-paraphrase sentences about abstracta.

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Arvid Båve
University of Lisbon

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References found in this work

Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Propositional Content.Peter Hanks - 2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
What is Meaning?Scott Soames - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
On What There Is.W. V. O. Quine - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin, The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 221-233.

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