Abstract

The paper attempts to clarify a fundamental similarity and some relevant differences between empirical-scientific and fictional thought experiments. For this purpose, the second section of the paper provides a brief outline of a quasi-Kantian account of thought experiments (TE) in the empirical sciences from the viewpoint of a radically functional, strictly not material, a priori. On the basis of this account, a fundamental similarity and two main differences between empirical-scientific and narrative thought experiments are brought to the fore: the counterfactual construction of idealised scenarios is a fundamental characteristic that is shared by scientific and fictional thought experiments (and, more generally, by science and art). The differences depend on the different intentionalities to which this construction is subordinated. Fictional TEs, instead of resolving the dimension of counterfactuality in real empirical facts or processes, use it to transpose certain cultural contents (thoughts, feelings, possible courses of action, etc.) into a dimension outside any particular space and time, which are able to produce a symbolic shelter that protects us from the particular adverse events of concrete life. This, on the one hand, generates in us the feeling of pleasure or enjoyment that tradition has so often linked to artistic enjoyment and, on the other, urges us, implicitly or explicitly, to re-enact those contents in the first person and to take an evaluative stance towards them.