Evolution, the emotions, and rationality in social interaction

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):156-157 (2003)
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Abstract

Although Colman's criticisms of orthodox game theory are convincing, his assessment of progress toward construction of an alternative is unnecessarily restrictive and pessimistic. He omits an important multidisciplinary literature grounded in human evolutionary biology, in particular the existence and function of social emotions experienced when facing some strategic choices. I end with an alternative suggestion for modifying orthodox game theory.

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