Between unity and incommensurability: Dworkin and Raz on moral and ethical values

Jurisprudence 13 (2):169-193 (2021)
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Abstract

Dworkin and Raz reject moral skepticism and offer holistic and non-derivative defenses of the objectivity of value. Furthermore, they acknowledge a role for social practices in the explanation of t...

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References found in this work

Reasons: A Puzzling Duality?T. M. Scanlon - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Clarendon Press.
The third theory of law.John Mackie - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1):3-16.
Value: a Menu of Questions.Joseph Raz - 2013 - In John Keown & Robert P. George (eds.), Reason, morality, and law: the philosophy of John Finnis. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 13.

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