Oversimplification

In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 286–288 (2018-05-09)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'oversimplification'. The fallacy of oversimplification occurs when we attempt to make something appear simpler by ignoring certain relevant complexities. Sometimes oversimplification makes sense. The world can be a convoluted place, and we may need to ignore certain factors in order to get our heads around certain thorny ideas. But in other cases, oversimplification can be used deliberately to deceive or divide people. In order to avoid the fallacy, we need to become comfortable with accepting complicated answers to certain questions. When we obscure, ignore, or simply fail to identify certain factors, we run a high risk of misunderstanding reality. If we try to address an issue on the basis of this mistaken understanding, there is a good chance our actions will ‐ at best ‐ be ineffective, or ‐ at worst ‐ exacerbate the very problem we are trying to solve.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,757

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Oversimplification.Nicholas Rescher - 2007 - Epistemologia 30 (1):41-60.
Oversimplification in Philosophy.Randall S. Firestone - 2019 - Open Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):396-427.
Facing complexity: Against scientific oversimplification.Guenther Palm - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):902-903.
“A temporary oversimplification”: Mayr, Simpson, Dobzhansky, and the origins of the typology/population dichotomy (part 1 of 2). [REVIEW]Joeri Witteveen - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 54 (C):96-105.
“A temporary oversimplification”: Mayr, Simpson, Dobzhansky, and the origins of the typology/population dichotomy. [REVIEW]Joeri Witteveen - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 55 (C):20-33.
Mistaking the Relevance of Proximate Causation.David Kyle Johnson - 2018-05-09 - In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 181–184.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-15

Downloads
16 (#1,199,504)

6 months
7 (#730,543)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Daniel Burkett
State University of New York at Binghamton

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references