Abstract

It is often said that Hegel denies the law of non-contradiction and that he says that logical concepts apply only to objects which are relative to consciousness . I argue against both notions. While he does not hold that logical contradictions are simply senseless, he does hold that they are logically inadequate, and that they cancel themselves, resulting in non-contradictory but universal claims. He also holds that contingently true claims are logically inadequate. Logically satisfactory claims are non-tautological but universally true . These are the Hegelian "concrete universals". The main critical issue is not Hegel's acceptance of logical contradictions. It is his doctrine that there are literally universal but non-tautological claims. He differs with logical positivist logicians, for example, who hold that non-tautological claims are in principle only contingently true. If logic is to allow for the fact that actual historical reality is ultimately and fundamentally contingent, it is necessary to resist Hegel's move beyond contingency. ;The first section of the thesis concerns the method of logic, and the general role of contradiction in Hegelian dialectic. ;The second section deals with logical categories like identity, opposition and contradiction. Hegel recognises substantive contradictions in addition to merely formal contradictions. Substantive contradictions involve a conflict between different logical subjects, while formal contradictions merely assert A & -A. He holds that substantive contradictions also collapse. The positive doctrine is that there are internal, not external relations between logical subjects. The section closes with an outline of the doctrine of the syllogism, which represents the highest form of the logical method. ;The third section takes up the Hegelian claim that logic is objective: logical concepts apply to real objects, not just phenomena. The argument for the objectivity doctrine is developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I interpret the method of phenomenology and the Hegelian critique of subjective idealism and traditional realism. The interpretation is applied to Chapter 3 of the Phenomenology of Spirit