Rights Forfeiture Theorists Should Embrace the Duty View of Punishment

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):317-327 (2017)
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Abstract

In this paper, I bring into conversation with each other two views about the justification of punishment: the rights forfeiture theory and the duty view. I argue that philosophers attracted to the former should instead accept the latter.

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Ben Bryan
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

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Imposing Duties and Original Appropriation.Bas van der Vossen - 2015 - Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (1):64-85.

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