Moore-paradoxicality and the principle of charity

Theoria 75 (3):245-247 (2009)
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Abstract

In a recent article in Theoria , Hamid Vahid offered an explanation of the phenomenon of Moore-paradoxicality which employed Davidson's Principle of Charity regarding radical interpretation. I argue here that Vahid's explanation fails.

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10.1111/j.1755-2567.2009.01042.x

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