Why Empiricism Won't Work

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:271-279 (1992)
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Abstract

Thought experiments provide us with scientific understanding and theoretical advances which are sometimes quite significant, yet they do this without new empirical input, and possibly without any empirical input at all. How is this possible? The challenge to empiricism is to give an account which is compatible with the traditional empiricist principle that all knowledge is based on sensory experience. Thought experiments present an enormous challenge to empiricist views of knowledge; so much so that some of us have thrown in the towel and embraced good old fashioned platonism. I'll try to explain why one brand of empiricism, namely John Norton's argument view of thought experiments, won't work

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reprint Brown, James Robert (2004) "Why Empiricism Won't Work". In Hitchcock, Christopher, Contemporary debates in philosophy of science, pp. : Blackwell (2004)

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James Robert Brown
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

Citations of this work

Galileo and the indispensability of scientific thought experiment.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):397-424.
Otto Neurath's Scientific Utopianism Revisited - A Refined Model for Utopias in Thought Experiments.Alexander Linsbichler & Ivan Ferreira da Cunha - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie (2):1-26.
The evidential significance of thought experiment in science.James W. McAllister - 1996 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (2):233-250.

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