The mode of existence of values: Hume versus Reid

Convivium: revista de filosofía 4:51-64 (1993)
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to establish that although Thomas Reid uses his version of value realism as a weapon with which to beat David Hume's value nominalism, at a deeper level of analysis the realism of the one and the nominalism of the other are fully compatible.

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