Abstract

The only sensible solution to the mind-body problem is a type-type identity theory. I wish to argue for a version of Type-Type identity theory that withstands the usual seemingly fatal objections, which I call ‘R-Type Identity Theory’ and which has three claims. First, an identity theory does not entail ‘reducing’ or ‘eliminating’ one set of things to or in favor of another set of things and introduces epidentity (treating identified relata as distinct). Secondly, pain and what-it-is-like to be in pain are distinguishable and introduces frigid stipulation (a pragmatic rather than semantic property by which we stipulate reference). Finally there may be more than one type of mental state in question and introduces subtypes (a pained brainless Martian is evidence that their state is a pain subtype). With the standard objections to identity theory taken care of we are free to embrace the only truly satisfying, non-Cartesian, philosophy of mind.