Perspectival truth and color primitivism

In Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 1--34 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Perspectivalism is a semantic theory according to which the contents of utterances and mental states (perhaps of a particular kind) have a truth-value only relative to a particular perspective (or standard) determined by the context of the speaker, assessor, or bearer of the mental state. I have defended this view for epistemic terms, moral terms and predicates of personal taste elsewhere (Brogaard 2008a, 2008b, forthcoming a). The main aim of this paper is to defend perspectivalism about color perception and color discourse. The content of color perception and color discourse, I will argue, has a truth-value only relative to an appropriate viewing condition and the perceiver, or a perceiver deferred to.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,505

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Color Experience: A Semantic Theory.Mohan Matthen - 2010 - In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Bradford. pp. 67--90.
Predicates of Personal Taste and Faultless Disagreement.Mihai Hîncu - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (2):160-185.
The trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. Or how I learned to stop caring about truth.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press.
Color adjectives and radical contextualism.Nathaniel Hansen - 2011 - Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (3):201 - 221.
Color Adjectives and Radical Contextualism.Nat Hansen - 2011 - Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (3):201-221.
Reliable color misrepresentation and color vision (in print), Special Issue: Brogaard, B. and French, R. (Eds).Dimitria Gatzia - 2024 - In Robert French & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception. Springer. pp. 179-197.
Assertoric Force Perspectivalism: Relativism Without Relative Truth.Lionel Shapiro - 2014 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1.
Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste.Peter Lasersohn - 2005 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (6):643--686.
Color, context, and compositionality.Christopher Kennedy & Louise Mcnally - 2010 - Synthese 174 (1):79-98.
Colors without circles?Kathrin Glüer - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1):107--131.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-06-24

Downloads
664 (#39,493)

6 months
316 (#6,724)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Berit Brogaard
University of Miami

Citations of this work

What Are Centered Worlds?Shen‐yi Liao - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):294-316.
Strong representationalism and centered content.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.
Relativity and Degrees of Relationality.Jack Spencer - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):432-459.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.
The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.
The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.

View all 40 references / Add more references