Abstract

This essay is a response to the recent reemergence in the philosophical literature of direct acquaintance theories of epistemic justification and concept acquisition. A central difficulty that confronts proponents of direct acquaintance is that of providing an adequate account of the nature of the cognitive act involved in direct acquaintance. In this essay, I articulate two different approaches to this project. I distinguish those who claim that all acts of cognition involve conceptualization, subsumption of a particular under a kind, or something therelike from those who think that there are non-conceptually mediated states with cognitive, phenomenal content. I locate a range of views of each kind on what I call "The Conceptual-Content Continuum" and "The Phenomenal-Content Continuum," respectively. ;I then examine both historical and contemporary direct acquaintance accounts of concept acquisition and epistemic justification. In particular I examine the work of Bertrand Russell, C. D. Broad, Howard Robinson, and Richard Fumerton. My aim is to see whether the contemporary accounts fare any better than their historical counterparts in the face of certain objections. I argue that they do not