Group Belief for a Reason

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):1-22 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper I investigate what it is for a group to believe something for a reason. I defend a non-summative account on which a group can believe that p for a reason even though none of its members believe that p for that reason. By contrast, a summative account would hold that the reason for which a group believes that p is a function of the reason for which its members believe that p. I argue that the proposed non-summative account deals better with cases in which members of a group believe that p for different reasons. I also defend it against a range of objections, including that it conflicts with epistemic norms for assertion and action.

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References found in this work

Group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Philip Pettit.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Groups as Agents.Deborah Tollefsen - 2015 - Malden, MA: Polity.
On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Ethics 102 (4):853-856.

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