Cognitive dissonance and the logic of racism

In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. New York: Routledge (2020)
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Abstract

There is no abstract for this chapter. The following is a summary. We distinguish between, explicit, inadvertent, and habitual racist actions. We argue that while inadvertent bigots and habitual racists are inclined to (sincerely) deny that they committed a racially motivated action, they have different reasons for their denial. Inadvertent bigots are denying it because, however deeply they search, they are not going to find any such motive. Habitual racists, by contrast, may hold explicit egalitarian attitudes but they are nonetheless implicitly racially motivated. There is thus an implicit stressful conflict between their covert racist intentions and their overt egalitarian attitudes. While they aren’t aware of the source of this distress, cognitive dissonance theory predicts that they nevertheless will engage in dissonance-reducing strategies. Specifically, we argue that habitual racists will be inclined to confabulate a description of the action in non-racial terms.

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Author Profiles

Berit Brogaard
University of Miami
Dimitria Gatzia
University of Akron

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Intelligent Virtue.Julia Annas - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
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Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
Pedagogy of the oppressed.Paulo Freire - 2004 - In David J. Flinders & Stephen J. Thornton (eds.), The Curriculum Studies Reader. Routledge.

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