- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Conditionalization and expected utility
Philosophy of Science 43 (3):415-419 (1976)
Abstract
This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)Other Versions
No versions found
My notes
Similar books and articles
Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.
Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):413-424.
Preference Change and Utility Conditionalization.Michael Nielsen - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):101-105.
Shrinking three arguments for conditionalization.Sophie Horowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):303-319.
The value of cost-free uncertain evidence.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz & Dominika Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13313-13343.
Accurate Updating for the Risk Sensitive.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (3):751-776.
Conditionalization, cogency, and cognitive value.Graham Oddie - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):533-541.
Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection.Kenny Easwaran - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (1):119-142.
On the application of J.m. Keynes's approach to decision making.Michael E. Brady - 1994 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (2):99 – 112.
Best Laid Plans: Idealization and the Rationality–Accuracy Bridge.Brett Topey - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
274 (#98,254)
6 months
14 (#224,604)
2009-01-28
Downloads
274 (#98,254)
6 months
14 (#224,604)
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
An Accuracy‐Dominance Argument for Conditionalization.R. A. Briggs & Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):162-181.
How should your beliefs change when your awareness grows?Richard Pettigrew - 2024 - Episteme 21 (3):733-757.
What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3427-3463.
Deference Done Better.Kevin Dorst, Benjamin A. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, Brooke E. Husic & Branden Fitelson - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):99-150.
References found in this work
On the principle of total evidence.Irving John Good - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):319-321.
Slightly more realistic personal probability.Ian Hacking - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (4):311-325.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-f8568656d-xdmqb uwo