Belief states and narrow content

Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67 (1993)
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Abstract

The first thesis is that beliefs play a role in explaining behavior. This is reasonably uncontroversial, though it has been controverted. Why did I raise my arm? Because I wanted to emphasize a point, and believed that I could do so by raising my arm. The belief that I could emphasize a point by raising my arm is central to the most natural explanation of my action

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Curtis Brown
Trinity University

Citations of this work

Narrow mental content.Curtis Brown - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
How “Meaning” became “Narrow Content”.Paweł Grabarczyk - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):155-171.

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References found in this work

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein, Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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