An intersubjective model of agency for game theory

Economics and Philosophy 36 (3):355-382 (2020)
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Abstract

This paper proposes a new interpretation of non-cooperative games that shows why the unilateralism of best-reply reasoning fails to capture the mutuality of strategic interdependence. Drawing on an intersubjective approach to theorizing individual agency in shared context, including a non-individualistic model of common belief without infinite regress, the paper develops a general model of a 2 × 2 simultaneous one-shot non-cooperative game and applies it to games including Hi-Lo, Stag Hunt, Prisoners’ Dilemma, Chicken, BoS and Matching Pennies. Results include High as the rational choice in Hi-Lo, and Cooperate as a possible rational choice in the Prisoners’ Dilemma.

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Citations of this work

Judgments of taste as strategic moves in a coordination game.Filip Buekens - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Team preferences.Robert Sugden - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):175-204.
Twenty-Five On.David Gauthier - 2013 - Ethics 123 (4):601-624.
Team Reasoning and Intentional Cooperation for Mutual Benefit.Robert Sugden - 2014 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):143–166.

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