Against Denialism

The Monist 102 (1):110-129 (2019)
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Abstract

Several philosophers deny that an individual person’s emissions of greenhouse gas do any harm; I call these “individual denialists.” I argue that each individual’s emissions may do harm, and that they certainly do expected harm. I respond to the denialists’ arguments.

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10.1093/monist/ony024

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John Broome
University Of Oxford

Citations of this work

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The Moral Inefficacy of Carbon Offsetting.Tyler M. John, Amanda Askell & Hayden Wilkinson - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):795-813.
Carbon Tax Ethics.Kian Mintz-Woo - 2024 - WIREs Climate Change 15 (1):e858.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
The possibility of parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.

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