Abstract

Liberal political theory is often understood as being underpinned by an individualistic social ontology, and it is sometimes objected that this type of ontology makes it difficult to address injustices that involve social groups and informal forms of privilege. It is argued here that, to the extent that liberals do fail to properly address such structural injustices, the main problem can instead be understood to lie with a rules-centric understanding of institutions – one which is actually out of line with a proper ontological individualism. If institutions are instead understood as distributions of right and duties, held by individuals, it becomes much more straightforward to identify institutional privilege in terms of inequalities in those distributions. The relevant rights and duties can be explicated in terms of informal Hohfeldian incidents and it is argued that patterned distributions of such incidents can come to exist, and be maintained, through how we develop a largely intuitive sense of where our interpersonal boundaries run and form social expectations about which kinds of behaviour will typically receive pushback in some form.