Searle on the Brink

PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 1 (1994)
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Abstract

In his recent _The Rediscovery of the Mind_ John Searle tries to destroy cognitive science _and_ preserve a future in which a ``perfect science of the brain'' (1992, p. 235) arrives. I show that Searle can't accomplish both objectives. The ammunition he uses to realise the first stirs up a maelstrom of consciousness so wild it precludes securing the second

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Author's Profile

Selmer Bringsjord
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

Citations of this work

Baars Falls Prey to the Timidity He Rejects:Commentary on Baars on Contrastive Analysis.Selmer Bringsjord - 1994 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 1.

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
The Rediscovery of the Mind.John R. Searle - 1992 - MIT Press. Edited by Ned Block & Hilary Putnam.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.

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