Nonconceptual content and the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):760-761 (1999)
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Abstract

The notion of nonconceptual content in Dienes & Perner's theory is examined. A subject may be in a state with nonconceptual content without having the concepts that would be used to describe the state. Nonconceptual content does not seem to be a clear-cut case of either implicit or explicit knowledge. It underlies a kind of practical knowledge, which is not reducible to procedural knowledge, but is accessible to the subject and under voluntary control.

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Ingar Brinck
Lund University

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