The Structure of Cognitive Agency

Acta Analytica 31 (3):285-296 (2016)
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Abstract

Credit theories of knowledge have to explain the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to cognitive agents. The most promising way to explain these conditions is to offer an account of cognitive agency that is a plausible development of the uncontroversial notion that we are believing subjects. This article develops and defends a Structuralist model of cognitive agency.

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Daniel Breyer
Illinois State University

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References found in this work

The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
Freedom Within Reason.Susan Wolf - 1990 - New York: Oup Usa.
Agency and answerability: selected essays.Gary Watson - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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