Abstract

Mainstream psychologists have not only ignored the unique and radical character of practice; they have generally misunderstood it. A major reason for this ignorance and misunderstanding is mainstream psychology's assumption of a particular ontology--abstractionism. With abstractionism, psychologists have generally assumed that abstractions, such as theories, techniques, and principles, capture and embody the fundamentally real. Most pertinently, abstractions are believed to precede and lay the foundation for good and thoughtful practice. Indeed, practices do not exist, in an important ontological sense, except in relation to the concrete and particular situations and cultures that give rise to them, implying what we might call a relational ontology. The purpose of this article is to explore the possible meanings and implications of a relational ontology for psychology. I first attempt to clarify the important features of relational conceptions in general, distinguishing most importantly between their weak and strong forms. Then, I situate strong or ontological relationality historically by describing its initial embrace and eventual rejection by early scientists. To bring these historical lessons into the present, ontological relationality is next compared to the abstractionist understandings of the real and fundamental in mainstream psychology. These two forms of ontology are then illustrated by exploring their contrasting implications for individual and community identity. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)