Normative Ethics

Abstract

Normative Ethics examines a basis of moral aptitude in the implication of ethical perspective and understanding. The article utilizes concepts proposed in Jameson Brennan’s, Determinism in Epistemology, in providing summary of how determinism affects ethical standards and ultimately creates a contrast between inherent morality, and ethical concepts derived from deterministic principles. The article also draws consideration to Immanuel Kant’s ‘Categorical Imperative’ when considering the essence of indefinite or finite moral understandings. Ultimately, Normative Ethics asserts that all normative ethics, as they are a construction of artificial ideals, are a fallacy, exploring the regular applications of such an assertion. The article then provides theology over the initial construction of normative ethics, demonstrating how fear and general aversion commiserates the construction of a false ideal (morality).

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