Declarative Representation of Revision Strategies

Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 11 (1-2):151-167 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a nonmonotonic framework for belief revision in which reasoning about the reliability of different pieces of information based on meta-knowledge about the information is possible, and where revision strategies can be described declaratively. The approach is based on a Poole-style system for default reasoning in which entrenchment information is represented in the logical language. A notion of inference based on the least fixed point of a monotone operator is used to make sure that all theories possess a consistent set of conclusions.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,597

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The lexicographic closure as a revision process.Richard Booth - 2001 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 11 (1):35-58.
Belief Revision, Conditional Logic and Nonmonotonic Reasoning.Wayne Wobcke - 1995 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (1):55-103.
Choice revision.Li Zhang - 2019 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 28 (4):577-599.
Seeing is believing.B. van Linder, W. van der Hoek & J.-J. Ch Meyer - 1997 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (1):33-61.
A Structuralist Theory of Belief Revision.Holger Andreas - 2011 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (2):205-232.
Selective Base Revisions.Marco Garapa - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (1):1-26.
Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision.F. Berto - 2018 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):559-575.
Structured argumentation dynamics: Undermining attacks in default justification logic.Stipe Pandžić - 2022 - Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 90 (2-3):297-337.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-01-21

Downloads
49 (#450,040)

6 months
12 (#304,424)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations