Abstract

The aim of this thesis is two-fold: first and foremost, it is to explore an empirical approach to the problem of identifying a framework that objectively distinguishes virtue from vice, the moral from the immoral; second, it seeks to apply the results of this effort, a science of morality that is, to uncover which social, economic, religious, and political institutions best satisfy our ethical obligations. In pursuing this aim, we take David Hume, the 18th century Scottish philosopher, as our guide. His inquiries into the science of morality, and his application of it, are what we explore. The thesis begins by pointing out a science of morals must answer two questions: how do we differentiate between virtue and vice--is it by reason or feeling? What do we determine as virtuous and vicious? In Chapter 1, we show how Hume claims feeling, or sentiment, is the basis of moral evaluations. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss Hume's theory that sentiments distinguish what is agreeable and useful, both personally and socially, as virtuous. Chapter 4 takes up Hume's answer to the question left dangling in the first three chapters: why should reason not be the one that establishes morality? At this point, Hume's renowned scepticism emerges as a threat to the viability of a science of morality, a threat dealt within Chapter 5. From there, the thesis takes a more political turn, as we consider Hume's views on justice from Chapters 6 to 8. Justice is seen to be solely a matter of social utility, a utility maximized in prevailing historical conditions, by a wealth-creating economic order. The thesis finishes by explaining Hume's support for democracy as well as his call for a secular culture committed to the flourishing of the arts and sciences. ;In the end, Hume's science of morality supports a society pretty much like our own and thereby teaches us to respect and cherish our institutions