Shared agency

In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the social sciences: philosophical theory and scientific practice. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 41--59 (2009)
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Abstract

Human beings act together in characteristic ways. Forms of shared activity matter to us a great deal, both intrinsically – think of friendship and love, singing duets, and the joys of conversation -- and instrumentally – think of how we frequently manage to work together to achieve complex goals. My focus will be on activities of small, adult groups in the absence of asymmetric authority relations within those groups. My approach begins with an underlying model of individual planning agency, and then seeks a conceptual and metaphysical bridge from such individual planning agency to modest forms of sociality.

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Michael Bratman
Stanford University

Citations of this work

Modest sociality and the distinctiveness of intention.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149-165.
A Framework for Social Ontology.Brian Epstein - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (2):147-167.
Common Knowledge and Reductionism about Shared Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):315-326.

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