Passé Pains

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 46:21-32 (2022)
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Abstract

Why are pains bad for us? A natural answer is that it is just because of how they feel (or their felt-qualities). But this answer is cast into doubt by cases of people who are unbothered by certain pains of theirs. These pains retain their felt-qualities, but do not seem bad for the people in question. In this paper, I offer a new response to this problem. I argue that in such cases, the pains in question have become “just more of the same,” and for this reason have ceased to be bad for the relevant individuals. It is because they (implicitly) recognise this that they are unbothered by such pains.

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Ben Bramble
Australian National University

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References found in this work

What makes pains unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
A New Defense of Hedonism about Well-Being.Ben Bramble - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3:85-112.
What Pain Asymbolia Really Shows.Colin Klein - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):493-516.
The badness of pain.Gwen Bradford - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (2):236-252.

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