Mirror Self‐Recognition and Self‐Identification

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):284-303 (2017)
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Abstract

That great apes are the only primates to recognise their reflections is often taken to show that they are self-aware—however, there has been much recent debate about whether the self-awareness in question is psychological or bodily self-awareness. This paper argues that whilst self-recognition does not require psychological self-awareness, to claim that it requires only bodily self-awareness would leave something out. That is that self-recognition requires ‘objective self-awareness’—the capacity for first person thoughts like ‘that's me’, which involve self-identification and so are vulnerable to error through misidentification. This objective self-awareness is distinct from bodily or psychological self-awareness, requires cognitive sophistication and provides the beginnings of a more conceptual self-representation which might play a role in planning, mental time travel and theory of mind.

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Alexandria Boyle
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

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On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (3):324-342.
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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans & John Mcdowell - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (238):534-538.
Mental models of mirror self-recognition: Two theories.Robert W. Mitchell - 1993 - New Ideas in Psychology 11 (3):295-325.

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