The Old Razzmatazz: Joseph Raz and the Prospects of a Perfectionist Liberalism
Dissertation, University of Notre Dame (
2003)
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Abstract
Joseph Raz provides a novel defense of the liberal-welfare state. He eschews both pure libertarian and collectivists positions in favor of the state that combines a defense of liberty with a proper understanding of the nature of the social requirements requisite to that liberty. Since defending the liberal-welfare state is not a novel undertaking, Raz articulates insightful critiques of other such defenses, showing their inadequacies and pointing to the proper path of defense. Raz understands Rawls to be his main rival in this engagement, with Rawls advocating a Kantian-like theory of moral autonomy. Raz rejects the necessity and even the logic of moral autonomy, and adopts what he calls a perfectionist defense of liberalism, committing himself to a view of personal autonomy as a good of the liberal state that should be nurtured by that state, as opposed to the state remaining objective or neutral with respect to all doctrines of the good. This perfectionist conception of personal autonomy is embedded in a teleological theory of human well-being and accompanied by a unique conception of practical reason. In the body of the dissertation, I offer accounts of both Raz's theory of practical reason and his perfectionist liberalism based on the idea that autonomy is a good to be developed. I conclude the dissertation with a critique of Raz's position, arguing that his perfectionist conception of well-being requires a much fuller development of the contours of human character than his explication of personal autonomy provides. Raz argues that the psychological effects of limiting the ability of an agent to make minor decisions impair the agent's ability to make the important decisions that constitute a person's overall well-being. I contend that autonomy's value can only be realized with the development of other human excellences, the nurturing of which can be the object of governmental policy in a legitimate state, and thus that the psychological effect of coercion could only be one among a range of consequences of governmental policy on the quest for personal well-being